A Uniform Approach to Rule 11 Sanctions
Alan E. Untereiner Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure' governs abusive tactics and frivolous pleadings, motions, or other papers submitted in federal court. Since 1983, when the Rule was strengthened to encourage sanctioning, judges increasingly have sanctioned litigants advancing far-fetched claims, or filing papers based on hasty research into the facts or the law. ' In just under five years, Rule 11 has produced over 1,000 cases' and a flurry of academic commentary. 4 Rule 11 is transforming the conduct of litigation in the federal courts. 5 Critics of amended Rule 11 argue that it chills creative advocacy, 6 generates wasteful satellite litigation, 7 interferes with the attorney-client rela- [Vol. 97: 901 tionship, 8 sours relations between opposing counsel 9 and between bench and bar, 0 overdeters particular types of claimants," 1 and conflicts with the liberal pleading regime of the Federal Rules." 2 Supporters of the Rule, however, contend that it deters much frivolous litigation (thereby conserving judicial resources)," compensates the victims of vexatious litigation, and educates the bar about appropriate standards of conduct. 1 ' A problem recognized by both supporters and critics has been Rule 11's inconsistent application. 5 Varying judicial attitudes-in particular, disagreement over the primary purpose of Rule i 1 "-and the absence of standards or guidelines for deciding both whom to sanction 17 (1985) .
11. See, e.g., Note, supra note 6, at 631 (civil rights plaintiffs). Recent empirical data demonstrates that civil rights and employment discrimination plaintiffs are sanctioned disproportionately. Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189, 200-01 (1988) ; see also LaFrance, Federal Rule I I and Public Interest Litigation, 22 VAL. U.L. REv. 331, 333 (1988) (arguing that Rule 11 is "antithetical to public interest litigation").
12. Note, supra note 6. One critic has gone so far as to question the power of judicial rulemakers to impose mandatory sanctions. Burbank 15. See, e.g., Schwarzer, supra note 5, at 1015 ("In interpreting and applying rule 11, the courts have become a veritable Tower of Babel."); Note, supra note 6, at 638-41; Grosberg, The Rule I1 Debate: Circuit Gives No Guidance in Eastway, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 14, 1987, at 19, col. 4; Joseph, supra note 3, at 89; see also infra Section III-A.
16. See infra Section II-B. 17. The secondary literature on amended Rule 11 has not analyzed the problem of whom to sanction, discussing it only briefly in the context of broader surveys of the Rule. See, e.g., Vairo, supra note 11, at 227-28; Note, supra note 13, at 402-03; Note, (1988) [hereinafter Note, Intended Application] (arguing that in most cases courts should sanction attorney alone).
18. Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., 836 F.2d 866, 871 (5th Cir. 1988) (en bane) (Rule 11 decisions "have not always been consistent, producing confusion among the bench and bar, as well as inequitable results.").
19. See S. KASSIN, supra note 4, at 45 (finding willingness among judges to sanction but limited "clarity and uniformity" in Rule's application); Grosberg, Illusion and Reality in Regulating Lawyer Performance: Rethinking Rule 11, 32 VILL. L. REv. 575, 587-88 & nn. 42-43 (1987) ; see also Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 821 F.2d 121, 126 (2d Cir.) (Pratt, J., dissenting) (noting "apparent disparities, even capriciousness, that now seem to characterize much of rule 11 jurisprudence"). cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 269 (1987) ; Weiss, supra note 9, at 26 ("Many judges... judges and jurisdictions with different sanctioning records 2 " have imposed varying sanctions on similarly situated violators.
2 1 Lack of uniformity has undercut Rule 11's goals. 22 More fundamentally, judges and commentators have tended to view Rule 11 as involving discrete and unconnected judicial determinations.
This Note proposes an integrated approach to Rule 11 sanctions that will promote consistency in sanctioning practice. Section I briefly describes the Rule and its 1983 amendments. Section II proposes an analytical framework for understanding the three interpretive questions posed by Rule 11 -when is the Rule violated, who should be sanctioned, and what sanction is appropriate-and demonstrates that these questions are inseparably linked. It then argues that judges should bear in mind both this conceptual framework and the primary purpose of Rule 11-deterring frivolous litigation-when making sanction determinations. Section III demonstrates how judges have failed to understand the interconnectedness of Rule 1 1's interpretive questions, producing failures in the Rule's application. This Section also explains why appeals courts have failed to bring uniformity to Rule 11 case law. Section IV sets forth the benefits greater uniformity would bring, and Section V offers guidelines, based on the developing case law, to aid judges in answering the Rule's most neglected questions: whom to sanction and what sanction to impose.
I. THE 1983 AMENDMENTS TO RULE 11
Rule 11 was originally passed along with the other Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938, but judges employed it infrequently. 3 In response to growing concern over frivolous lawsuits and abusive tactics in federal court, Rule 11 was amended in 1983, a move which broadened its scope significantly. 24 The standards for sanctionable conduct were enhave deep-seated biases and are out to get particular lawyers. And boy, Rule 11 is some tool to do it with.").
20. According to Professor Grosberg, in the first two years under amended Rule 11, 12.2% of all Rule 11 opinions in which sanctions were imposed were written by three (of 684 sitting) federal Most commentators have hailed the wide latitude1 7 delegated to trial judges to fashion appropriate sanctions and to decide whom to sanction. 8 Because of her proximity to the offending conduct, the trial judge is considered best equipped to apportion responsibility for frivolous submissions and to tailor sanctions to fit particular violations. Appealing for its suggestion of careful, individualized judgments, this argument nonetheless overlooks the problems caused by both differences among judges 29 and the systemic effect of such highly discretionary, individualized judgments: a lack of overall uniformity in Rule 11 sanctions. 30 
II. A NEW CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING

RULE 11
Rule 11 is often analyzed as identifying three "prongs" of sanctionable conduct: legally frivolous, factually frivolous, and motivated by an improper purpose. This way of analyzing the Rule reflects a preoccupation with the determination of when conduct is sanctionable. A more useful conceptual framework for understanding Rule 11 considers two additional interpretive questions and focuses on the primary goal of the Rule-deterrence of frivolous litigation. 25. Amended Rule 11 established three prongs of sanctionable conduct: (1) insufficient legal basis, (2) insufficient factual basis, and (3) improper purpose.
26. Advisory Notes, supra note 6, at 198. 27. Both the broadened discretion to set the type and target of sanctions, and the narrowed discretion to impose a sanction once a violation is found, were aimed at encouraging judges to impose sanctions. These changes in judicial discretion were not an independent goal of the 1983 amendments, but rather a means to achieve greater enforcement and thus greater deterrence. The drafters apparently failed to appreciate that there might be little difference between finding no violation under the old Rule, and finding a violation but imposing a minimal sanction under the new Rule.
28. See When discussing the purposes behind Rule 11, courts and commentators mention compensation, 4 deterrence, 5 and punishment. 36 Unfortunately, few have gone beyond a mere invocation of one or more purposes to examine the connection between the Rule's primary purpose and its effectiveness. 40. See S. KASSIN, supra note 4, at 29; NEw YORK REPORT, supra note 4, at 23. When asked about Rule 1 I's primary purpose, 59.4% of district judges answered deterrence, while 19.6% said punishment and 21% compensation. S. KASSIN, supra note 4, at 29-32. Kassin's study involved a survey of 292 active federal district court judges. Judges were asked both to answer general questions about Rule 11 and to respond to various hypothetical fact situations. The study did not distinguish between specific and general deterrence.
The Extent and Effect of Disagreement over Primary Purpose
Despite its more recent date, the New York Bar Association's Report is limited, imprecise, and generally less useful in determining judicial views about Rule I I's purpose than is Kassin's 1985 national study. See NEW YORK REPORT, supra note 4, at 10, A7-A9.
41. See S. KASSIN, supra note 4, at 31. Judges who viewed compensation as Rule 11's key objective imposed sanctions 61.1% of the time in the hypotheticals. By contrast, those who saw Rule 11 as aimed at deterrence imposed sanctions only 48.5% of the time. The lowest rate occurred among punishment-oriented judges: 34.6%. One would thus expect district judges who believe that compensation is Rule 1l's primary purpose to impose sanctions almost twice as often as judges who focus on punishment.
42. Although Kassin's research indicated that compensation-oriented judges might grant higher attorneys' fee awards than punishment-oriented judges (with deterrence-oriented judges in the middle), "[tihe study does not provide a clear answer" on this issue, id. at 32, because the size of the subgroup relevant to this issue was too small. Id. at 30 n.63.
Judges who favor compensatory goals would be more likely to impose monetary sanctions and to set the sanction amount close to defendant's expenses. To ensure compensation, these judges might also favor joint and several sanctions against the plaintiff and her attorney. By contrast, judges who stress deterrence may be less likely to impose monetary sanctions, since nonmonetary ones can more effectively deter. In calculating monetary sanctions, deterrence-oriented judges might also be less likely to start with expenses incurred. These judges would be more likely to adjust a monetary sanction to an amount that deters the offending attorney or client. Instead of handing down joint and several sanc-disparities in sanctioning practice. 4 
Deterrence as the Primary Goal
To reduce disparities in sanctioning, judges should consider deterrence to be the primary goal of Rule 11. The Advisory Committee Notes mention only deterrence as the purpose behind the 1983 amendments. 44 In addition, most judges 4 " and commentators 4 agree that deterrence is the Rule's primary goal. 47 Finally, as a procedural rule, Rule 11 is aimed at streamlining the process of litigation by eliminating-i.e. deterring-frivolous submissions. 48 While compensation and punishment may be secondary aims of Rule 11, viewing either one as the Rule's primary purpose would be problemtions, judges who stress deterrence might apportion sanctions depending upon whether the party needing deterrence is attorney or client. A final set of judges, those who view the Rule as primarily aimed at punishment, might sanction only the most egregious violators, fashion the sanction to fit the degree of bad faith or culpability, and avoid joint and several sanctions unless both sanctioned individuals have demonstrated culpable behavior. Confusion has perhaps resulted because the text of Rule 11 indicates that an appropriate sanction "may include an order to pay ... the reasonable expenses incurred because of [the frivolous submission], including a reasonable attorney's fee." FED. R. Civ. P. 11. This language only reminds judges that monetary sanctions may be an appropriate sanction, and does not express a general preference for compensatory sanctions. See also Schwarzer, supra note 5, at 1020 (contrasting Rule 11 to Rule 37's explicit authorization of fee shifting, and arguing that "when the drafters of the rules meant to provide for fee shifting, they knew how to do it").
45. Prompted the New Rules of Civil Procedure, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 28, 1983, at 24, 34, col. 2 ("Although denominated a sanction provision, in reality it is more appropriately characterized as a cost-shifting technique."); Note, The Dynamics of Rule 11, supra note 17, at 329 (arguing that purpose is primarily punitive). See generally Grosberg, supra note 19, at 586-87 ("The stated objective of Rule 11 was to deter frivolous litigation and, thereby lessen the pressures on court dockets. Courts have often applied Rule 11, however, having in mind the secondary and unstated objectives of penalizing the offending lawyer and compensating the victim of needless litigation."); Nelken, supra note 6, at 1323-25 (arguing that two divergent views have emerged regarding purpose: compensation and punishment, with deterrence playing role in both views).
48. Grosberg, supra note 19, at 630-31.
atic. Several commentators have questioned the authority of the judiciary under the Rules Enabling Act to promulgate a procedural rule aimed at shifting costs but not requiring "bad faith." ' 4 9 A stress on compensation would also undercut the traditional American Rule, which requires litigants to bear only their own expenses and serves as a guarantor of access in American courts. 50 An emphasis on punishment as a primary purpose might raise similar doubts about faithfulness to the Rules Enabling Act. 51 A punitive focus is inappropriate for a rule that mandates sanctions under an objective standard but does not require bad faith. Finally, a focus on punishment would necessitate extensive procedural safeguards for violators. 
Specific and General Deterrence as Guides To Sanctioning
Translating the focus on deterrence into a guide to judicial action is a complicated task. A key distinction must be maintained between the purpose of Rule 11 and the purpose(s) of any particular sanction imposed under the Rule. 53 The purpose of Rule 11 itself would seem to be general deterrence: The Rule's existence serves as a general threat to discourage lawyers and litigants from engaging in prohibited conduct. 4 On the other hand, the purpose of any particular sanction is primarily specific deter-49. See Burbank, supra note 12 (questioning judiciary's power to apply either mandatory sanctions or sanctions for mere negligence under amended Rule 11); Grosberg, supra note 19, at 584 & n.28, 646-47. According to Professor Nelken, the compensation approach "ignores serious questions about the limits of the Supreme Court's rulemaking power." Nelken, supra note 6, at 1324 n.70; see also Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 260 (1975) (Congress has not "extended any roving authority to the Judiciary to allow counsel fees as costs or otherwise whenever the courts might deem them warranted."). See generally Roadway Express, Inc., v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 765-66 (1980) (noting bad faith exception to American Rule).
50. Schwarzer, supra note 5, at 1020 ("[T]o attribute a broad fee-shifting rationale to rule 11 is contrary to the American Rule; fee shifting ought not to be undertaken without clear authority."). Professor Vairo has argued that a focus on fee-shifting unduly encourages Rule 11 motions, thereby souring relations among attorneys and exacerbating the problem of satellite litigation. Vairo, supra note 11, at 204, 233.
51. See Grosberg, supra note 19, at 584 & n.28 (questioning whether punishment of abusive lawyers is proper procedural concern or within Supreme Court's rulemaking power under Rules Enabling Act).
52. If punitive in nature, monetary Rule 11 "fines" might assume a criminal character and, if they exceeded $500, require additional procedural safeguards, such as the right to jury trial. Schwarzer, supra note 10, at 202; see Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1558-61 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (discussing procedural safeguards required by due process guarantee). Perhaps because of the Advisory Committee's insistence that satellite litigation be avoided whenever possible, see Advisory Notes, supra note 6, at 201, these due process safeguards often have been disregarded. For general deterrence to be achieved, Rule I1's threat of sanctions must be credible. Sanctions must be imposed when violations occur; this appears to be happening with greater frequency. As for the size of sanctions, general deterrence normally will be furthered in proportion to the severity of the sanction." Yet Rule 11 operates against the backdrop of legitimate litigation activity: Choosing the most severe sanction in each case would discourage or "chill" legitimate lawsuits and valid litigation techniques. 57 In addition, massive sanctions could, in an individual case, go well beyond the needs of specific deterrence.
What is needed, then, is a more uniform approach to imposing and calculating individual sanctions-one that takes into account the differential need to specifically deter-so that the general deterrent aim is achieved without overdeterrence. Specific deterrence should be the guiding principle in the imposition of individual Rule 11 sanctions.", Of course, sanctions can also serve the secondary goals of compensation and punishment, but these aims must give way when they conflict with specific deterrence.
III. THE CURRENT FAILURE OF RULE 11's APPLICATION
A. Failures in Trial Court Application
The question of when conduct is sanctionable is, notably, one area of Rule 11 jurisprudence that enjoys considerable uniformity. 5 57. This is where the problem of overdeterrence arises. Aggressive representation of the client's interests, a premise of the adversary system, can resemble Rule I l's "improper purpose." In addition, under our system of notice pleading and ample opportunity for discovery, insufficiency of facts in pleadings is sometimes expected. Perhaps most important, the line between a creative and a frivolous legal argument can be thin indeed. See sources cited supra note 6. Because Rule 11 operates against this backdrop, it should be aimed at achieving optimal rather than maximal general deterrence. 
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consistently read an objective standard of sanctionable conduct into the Rule," 0 and appellate courts frequently have synthesized disparate interpretations within a circuit by reviewing these determinations de novo. 1 Even so, several commentators have proposed frameworks aimed at making determinations of when sanctionable conduct occurs more uniform. 2 Since this aspect of Rule 11 has been the focus of most commentary and proposals for uniformity, this Note will focus on the other two interpretive questions.
In deciding whom to sanction, courts have rarely discussed their rationales. 6 3 In the absence of guidance, many judges sanction the person whose signature is on the offending paper-namely, the attorney. Others decide whom to sanction without explanation." Some judges sanction the "party," without apportioning the sanction." Occasionally courts have sanctioned only the client. 66 In most Rule 11 cases, judges have sanctioned either the attorney alone, 7 or both attorney and client. For Rule 11 to achieve its deterrent aims, the party responsible for the frivolousness of the pleading must be sanctioned. This will sometimes require a detailed investigation by the judge, which cannot be avoided if sanctions are to be properly imposed. However, judges, not wanting to make a more detailed inquiry into relative fault, often leave apportionment to attorney and client. Joint and several sanctions on attorney and client provide the clearest example of judicial failure to place sanctions squarely on the responsible parties based upon relative fault. 6 Were Rule 11's primary goal compensation rather than deterrence, this might be preferable as a matter of policy. 69 As it is, joint and several sanctions both dard of compliance" as one of two major problems with Rule 1i's current operation). § 1920 (1982) . "Costs" refers to miscellaneous filing, duplication and witness costs incident to litigation, and are usually small compared to attorneys' fees.
60
A few courts have added to statutory costs and reasonable attorneys' fees the cost to taxpayers of the court's time spent on the frivolous filing, thus turning Rule 11 into a means of compensating the judicial system. See, e.g., National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors v. Turnage, 115 F.R.D. 543, 559 (N.D. Cal. 1987) ($15,000 to be paid into court for "unnecessary consumption of the court's time and resources"). The cost of the court's time is usually calculated at $600 per hour-a figure drawn from a recent law review article that calculated the average cost of an hour of a federal court ' judges have imposed "fines" under Rule 11-monetary sanctions unrelated to expense incurred and reflecting a punitive rationale."
B. Failures in Appellate Synthesis
Appellate courts have applied different standards of review to the three interpretive issues raised by Rule 11. Because Rule 11 requires judges to sanction specified types of proscribed conduct, the "when" question has been considered by most appeals courts to be a question of law and reviewed on a de novo basis. 78 By contrast, all appeals courts have considered the "who" and "what" questions to be matters within the discretion of the trial judge, and therefore reviewable only on an "abuse of discretion" standard. Thus, while divergent answers to the first question have enjoyed a measure of appellate synthesis, 79 courts of appeals have less frequently reviewed answers to the second and third queries, and then only to define the outer parameters of discretion. District courts lack appellate guidance to fill the vacuum left by the Advisory Committee Notes and the language of the Rule itself. 8 "
IV. THE BENEFITS OF A UNIFORM CONCEPTION OF RULE 11
Judicial acceptance of this Note's overall conception of Rule 11-including the Rule's primary deterrence purpose and its three, interrelated components-would promote uniformity in Rule 11 sanctions. In addition, the guidelines and factors described in Section V could provide needed direction to trial judges deciding whom to sanction and what sanction is appropriate. Guidelines have been used in other contexts to channel the exercise of a trial judge's discretion." While restrictive of judicial flexibility, guidelines offer numerous benefits, 82 including better notice, increased fairness and efficiency, and most importantly, optimal deterrence.
Fairness requires the legal system to apply uniform standards to those who are similarly situated. Guidelines that address whom to sanction and factors to be weighed in determining appropriate sanctions are especially needed to ensure equal treatment under Rule 11, since a major argument undercutting the Rule's legitimacy has been that disagreement among judges has produced widely disparate results. 8 Moreover, such guidelines would provide better notice to lawyers and clients about their respective areas of responsibility for frivolous submissions, 4 and increase judicial efficiency in administering Rule 11 cases. 85 Nonuniformity in the method of calculating Rule 11 sanctions can seriously undermine the Rule's primary purpose of deterrence. As those studying the problem of indeterminacy in the area of sentencing reform have recognized, treating similarly situated defendants differently may create unfair results or undercut the deterrent effect of criminalizing conduct. 8 6 In criminal sentencing, uniform treatment of similarly situated offenders has come to be seen as fairer, more effective, and more efficient than individualized judgments about individual offenders. 87 As applied today, Rule 11 probably both underdeters and overdeters. For example, it may overdeter plaintiffs' lawyers who often work on a contingency fee basis and who may be unwilling to pursue an innovative legal claim for fear of incurring a massive sanction. 88 The major arguments leveled against sentencing reform claims to greater deterrence-that low probabilities of apprehension and conviction, and the possibility of parole, undermine the deterrent value of uniform sentences-do not apply in the Rule 11 context. Undetected Rule 11 abuses are far less likely than undetected crimes because opposing lawyers have a built-in incentive to move for sanctions, and judges are explicitly empowered to raise the issue sua sponte. See generally J. ANDENAES, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE 34-65 (1974) (discussing factors influencing general deterrent effect of criminal sanctions); F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 56, at 92-209 (same).
88. Rule 11 provides that monetary sanctions, if imposed, may be based on "the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing .... ." FED. R. CIV. P. 11. This formula increases the likelihood that plaintiffs' lawyers will suffer high monetary sanctions, particularly since many the Rule probably underdeters defense counsel in large firms representing wealthy individuals or corporations. These lawyers and their clients might agree to risk Rule 11 sanctions, for example, in order to delay a judgment, particularly if there is a chance that only a minimal sanction will be imposed. Moreover, defense counsel in large firms often can surreptitiously shift sanctions onto clients, particularly onto longstanding ones. 89 In both of these contexts, a more uniform method of calculating and imposing sanctions, which takes account of the differential need to deter and is buttressed by safeguards against shifting, would optimize deterrence.
V.
GUIDELINES FOR THE NEGLECTED COMPONENTS
A. Whom to Sanction?
Case law indicates that the decision of whom to sanction under Rule 11 often depends upon which type of sanctionable conduct has occurred. While judges have not expressly analyzed the question of whom to sanction in these terms, the case law does suggest that different criteria are determinative for each type of violation. The following guidelines have an empirical as well as a normative component: They incorporate as well as extend the case law.
Submissions Not Warranted by Existing Law
Usually the attorney should bear sole responsibility for submitting a pleading or motion not warranted by law in violation of Rule 11.90 Normally a client will not be in a position to judge the validity of, 1 or to urge her lawyer to make, unwarranted legal claims. 2 Since legally frivolous violations comprise a large percentage of Rule 11 cases, handling them 91. See Note, The Dynamics of Rule 11, supra note 17, at 331 n.228 (sanctionable conduct more often attorney's than client's).
92. A few courts have considered the client's legal sophistication a reason for holding him at least partially liable for sanctions. See, e.g., Thrush v. Morrison, 665 F. Supp. 372, 376 (M.D. Pa. 1987) ($6,000 sanction imposed jointly and severally on attorney and on client who was "no stranger to the law"). But even if a legally sophisticated client knowingly urges her lawyer to advocate legally frivolous positions, the lawyer should bear the sanctions because he can more easily avoid the cost that an unwarranted legal submission imposes on the legal system and the opposing party.
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Courts are just beginning to address the difficult question of how to allocate sanctions among multiple attorneys who participate in preparing the legally frivolous submission. 93 These cases are rapidly changing the duties of cooperating lawyers under Rule 11.9' In general, judges should sanction only the attorney who has prepared the legally frivolous submission. 95 
Submissions Not Well Grounded in Fact
Under this prong of Rule 11, courts are defining, in piecemeal fashion, the division of responsibilities between attorney and client. At risk of drawing sanctions are submissions that either contain untrue facts, or omit facts that are or should be within the knowledge of the filing party. 96 Because the Rule explicitly imposes a duty upon the certifying attorney to make a reasonable prefiling inquiry into the factual basis and to certify that a submission is "well grounded" in fact, courts often have held the lawyer liable for factually frivolous submissions. On the other hand, many of these cases involve clients who provide their attorneys with false facts that form the basis of the attorney's submissions.
Courts generally will have to make a more detailed inquiry into responsibility for factually frivolous pleadings than for other types of violations. If a client knowingly provides false facts, 97 or provides facts that the client should have known were false, then the client should be sanctioned. 9 8 Clients should not be sanctioned, however, when the attorney fails to ask the 96. In keeping with our system of notice pleading, courts have been careful not to sanction for complaints that omit facts in the adversary's control. See Oliveri v. Thompson right questions to elicit legally relevant facts. 9 9 In addition, the attorney should be sanctioned for failure to take minimal steps to confirm the client's facts, when these facts could be verified easily by reference to the public record or to accessible documents.' 0 0
Submissions Interposed for an Improper Purpose
Lawyers frequently have been sanctioned for improper purpose violations. 1 0 Often, however, courts have without explanation simply sanctioned both attorney and client for these kinds of violations, apparently on the belief that somehow attorney and client shared the improper purpose. Courts should generally place responsibility for improper purpose violations on the lawyer since she exercises primary control over the litigation. Sanctioning the attorney will create an incentive for the attorney to second-guess the client in matters of legal strategy-the result that should be fostered. 0 2 Ultimately, it is the attorney who, as an officer of the court, must ensure that the court's processes are not abused.
Courts should scrutinize two types of filings, however, as potentially warranting client sanctions under the improper purpose prong of Rule 11: re-filed complaints and post-judgment motions filed by clients who have retained new lawyers. Courts could handle such re-filed complaints in several ways°. 1 3 They could require attorneys to investigate the past litigation record of new clients and sanction attorneys who could have discovered that a client's prior identical complaint had been dismissed. Alterna- Like the duty to make a "reasonable inquiry" into the facts, the attorney's duty to check public records would not impinge on the attorney-client relationship. See also Oliveri, 803 F.2d at 1265, 1277-78 (attorney must take reasonable steps to verify client's information but need not pass judgment on client's credibility); Advisory Notes, supra note 6, at 199.
101. The court in In re TCI Ltd., 769 F.2d 441 (7th Cir. 1985), affirmed the imposition of sanctions on a bankruptcy lawyer for filing frivolous claims aimed at delaying the implementation of an agreed-upon bankruptcy settlement. Judge Easterbrook rejected the lawyer's defense that he had filed the submissions at the insistence of his client. tively, courts could analyze these cases under the insufficient-as-of-law element and sanction the attorney because the complaint was barred by res judicata. These approaches are problematic because in most of these cases the client, and not the attorney, is the moving force. To impose sanctions on attorneys would not deter the client. On the other hand, when the same attorney remains with the repeat litigant throughout an entire campaign of harassment,1 0 4 or a new attorney is put on notice of the history of frivolous litigation,' 0 5 the court should allocate sanctions evenly between attorney and client, based on a presumption of equal fault.
Post-judgment motions interposed for an improper purpose" 0 8 also call for client sanctions, at least where the client changes attorneys after a settlement is reached or the case concluded. Only by placing the sanction on the client will courts deter this type of abuse. Frivolous post-judgment motions by the same attorney who tried the case should fall on the attorney, however.
B. What Sanction is "Appropriate"?
Because Rule 11 leaves the choice of sanction entirely to the trial judge's discretion, judges have employed widely divergent approaches unrelated to the need to deter the offending party. To increase uniformity, trial judges should consider various factors in setting monetary sanctions and ensure that monetary sanctions are not passed on to innocent parties. Appellate courts should review decisions about what sanction is appropriate under a heightened abuse of discretion standard.
Factors To Be Used by Judges in Determining Monetary Sanctions
In calculating monetary sanctions, courts have considered different factors, including the sanctioned person's limited resources, 0 7 the nature of the plaintiff's claims, 0 " and the need to compensate a party for expenses.
Other courts have deemed the requested fees inflated, 0 9 or invoked a "duty to mitigate" ' " to reduce the cost of legal fees incurred by the opposite side, implying that opposing counsel spent too much time opposing a frivolous paper. 1 1 ' Occasionally courts have increased the amount of a monetary sanction where the offending attorney or her firm is expert in a particular area.
There is already a trend towards requiring district judges to specify the grounds for deciding which sanction to impose,12 and appellate courts have sometimes reversed monetary sanctions for lack of specification."' In keeping with this trend, judges should consider specific factors in setting monetary Rule 11 sanctions. 1 1 The base figure should be calculated according to a uniform method," 5 based on cost incurred by the opposing side but not on court costs. 11 This method of initial calculation acknowledges that Rule 11, though aimed primarily at deterrence, also includes a compensatory purpose. Judges should then reduce this figure to achieve the Rule's primary purpose of deterrence. 17 In reducing monetary sanctions, judges should consider six factors:"'
(1) The violator's general bad faith or vindictive desire to punish the opponent.
(2) The degree of frivolousness.
These first two factors address the degree to which the violator has abused the court's processes and thus may be directly relevant to the amount and kind of sanction necessary to achieve specific deterrence." 9 (3) The violator's ability to pay.
Obviously, the sanctioned person's ability to pay will have an effect on the deterrent value of any given sanction: the poorer the target, the greater the deterrence achieved. 2 (4) The violator's level of experience and general reputation.
If the violator is inexperienced, a smaller sanction may suffice to achieve deterrence. 1 2 (5) The importance of not discouraging particular types of litigation.
Deterrence can only be achieved meaningfully against the backdrop of congressionally created disincentives and incentives for litigants. If Congress has expressed a clear preference for encouraging particular types of litigants by enacting a fee-shifting statute, then courts should reduce the monetary sanction. Thus, civil rights plaintiffs or others suing under statutes that provide for fee-shifting should have this mitigating factor considered.
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(6) The fee basis of representation.
In deciding how much deterrence a particular monetary sanction will produce, courts should consider the fee basis underlying the representation. Defense attorneys, who work on an hourly fee basis, will generally be able to pay monetary sanctions out of their billings, subject to market constraints on their fee rates. On the other hand, plaintiffs' attorneys who operate on a contingent fee basis may not have such billings to use to pay monetary sanctions. Thus, all else being equal, the same monetary sanction imposed on a plaintiff's attorney working on a contingent fee basis will have more of a deterrent effect. This consideration is related to the ability to pay factor. After considering all of the foregoing factors, judges should set the monetary sanction so that the violator is neither over-nor underdeterred. This Note's list of six factors includes five of Chief Judge Weinstein's. It omits the need to compensate as a separate factor because compensatory goals are already reflected in the calculation of the sanction's base. The Note's sixth factor, which concerns the fee basis of representation, will be relevant to deterrence in cases where attorneys are sanctioned.
119 
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Avoiding the Shifting Problem
If lawyers or clients are able to shift sanctions onto innocent parties, Rule 11's specific deterrent effect will largely be lost. 12 3 To the extent that sanctions harm a lawyer's reputation, of course, they cannot be shifted onto clients. The vast majority of Rule 11 sanctions, however, contain some shiftable element.
4
Joint and several sanctions pose special problems, because they actually encourage private shifting of sanctions. Even when courts impose sanctions on both attorney and client (but not jointly and severally), informal shifting may occur unless the court explicitly bars it. Shifting in any form enables attorneys and clients to undo the court's assignment of relative fault.
Courts are only beginning to tailor monetary sanctions so that they cannot be shifted. A small but growing number of Rule 11 cases have contained outright directives against shifting. 1 " 5 Courts could easily incorporate such anti-shifting directives in their opinions. A more effective way to prevent shifting would be to amend the Rule to incorporate an explicit ban on shifting. 6 In addition, courts could require attorneys to give their clients a copy of the sanction order. 1 2
C. Review Under a "Heightened" Abuse of Discretion Standard
The abuse of discretion standard is subject to wide interpretation. 1 
28
This disparity is not necessarily a bad thing; indeed, according to Judge Friendly, it may be "not only defensible but essential." 1 "' The reasons for using a strict as opposed to a loose abuse of discretion standard will vary according to the nature of the decision. 30 More circuits should apply the most stringent "abuse of discretion" standard, thereby vigilantly monitoring district court exercise of discretion under Rule 11.131 This is beginning to happen in a few courts. 1 " 2 VI. CONCLUSION Because amended Rule 11 gives the trial judge almost total discretion to determine whom to sanction and what sanction is "appropriate," sanctions under the Rule have varied widely. Certain judges have become known as frequent sanctioners, while others have only rarely imposed sanctions. Some have viewed sanctions primarily as a means of compensating litigants for costs incurred in defending against frivolous motions; others have employed the Rule more sparingly and primarily to punish. This Note has proposed a conceptual framework for viewing Rule 11, including a focus on deterrence and suggested guidelines and factors to trim the discretion of trial judges. The application of this framework will increase the uniformity of Rule 11 sanctions and optimize deterrence of frivolous litigation in the federal courts. 129. Friendly, supra note 30, at 764. 130. See United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 817-18 (3d Cir. 1981) (while need for first-hand observation of litigants or newness and variability of circumstances may initially require deference to trial judge's decision, once factors important to making discretionary decision "emerge from the montage of fact patterns," as in attorneys' fee area generally, then less deference should be accorded).
131. But see Levin & Sobel, supra note 7, at 600 (arguing that appellate courts have exercised their reviewing power in balanced fashion and that to give less respect to district court discretion could produce "intolerably burdensome proliferation of satellite litigation").
132. See, e.g., Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 821 F.2d 121 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 269 (1987); Cheek v. Doe, 828 F.2d 395, 397 (7th Cir.) (finding $10,500 sanction on pro se litigant abuse of discretion "particularly without a sufficient statement of reasons" and reducing sanction to $5,000), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 349 (1987) .
